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ALD-426        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-3204 
____________ 
 
ZACHARY SPADA, 
     Appellant 
v. 
 
DR. EDGAR ALFREDO MARTINEZ, M.D. 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-00113) 
Magistrate Judge: Keith A. Pesto 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)  
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 29, 2016 
 
Before:    AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 11, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Zachary Spada appeals from an order of the Magistrate Judge granting judgment 
to the defendant on the ground that he (Spada) failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.1  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
 Spada, an inmate currently housed at the State Correctional Institution at 
Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”), filed a civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Dr. Edgar Martinez, 
the Director of the Mental Health Unit (“MHU”) at the State Correctional Institution at 
Graterford (“SCI-Graterford”).  Spada alleged that Dr. Martinez was deliberately 
indifferent to his serious medical needs in December 2011.  He alleged that Martinez was 
treating him with Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication, but refused to give him Cogentin 
when the Haldol caused him to suffer a “dystonic” reaction.  Martinez moved to dismiss 
Spada’s amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that Spada 
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  
Martinez argued that, although Spada filed a grievance at SCI-Houtzdale, it was neither 
accepted nor decided on the merits.2  Spada argued in opposition that his complaint 
should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust because prison officials at SCI-Graterford 
                                              
1 The parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States magistrate judge, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c)(1). 
 
2 Approximately four months after the incident, Spada submitted a grievance at SCI- 
Houtzdale.  The grievance coordinator at SCI-Houtzdale rejected the grievance for 
procedural deficiencies, including that Spada had failed to submit it within 15 days of the 
incident.  DC-ADM 804, which governs grievance procedures in Pennsylvania prisons, 
provides that “[t]he inmate must submit a grievance to the Facility Grievance 
Coordinator/designee within 15 working days after the event upon which the claim is 
based.” 
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denied his numerous requests for a grievance form for at least 15 days after the incident 
occurred, causing his grievance to become time-barred under the grievance regulations. 
 The Magistrate Judge dismissed the amended complaint for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, and Spada appealed.  We reversed and remanded, holding that a 
factual question existed concerning whether SCI-Graterford officials refused to provide 
Spada with grievance forms, thereby rendering the grievance process unavailable to him 
within the meaning of § 1997e(a).  See Spada v. Martinez, 579 F. App’x 82, 86 (3d Cir. 
2014).  We specifically noted that the “Magistrate Judge did not review whether the 
grievance process was available to Spada during the 15-day period following the 
incident.”  Id. at 85. 
 On remand, the parties each moved for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
The Magistrate Judge denied the motions as inconsistent with our instructions on remand, 
and scheduled a bench trial on the factual question whether SCI-Graterford officials 
refused to provide Spada with grievance forms.  The Magistrate Judge convened the trial 
on June 27, 2016.  Spada testified on his own behalf but called no witnesses.  Martinez 
testified for the defense, as did James Houston, current MHU Director at SCI-Graterford, 
via video-conference.  After the trial, the Magistrate Judge made findings of fact and, in 
an order entered on June 28, 2016, granted judgment to Martinez on the ground that 
Spada failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
 Spada appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk granted 
Spada leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to 
summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third 
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Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit argument in writing, but he has 
not done so. 
 We will summarily affirm the judgment of the Magistrate Judge because no 
substantial question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil 
rights suit alleging unconstitutional conduct by prison officials “until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 
U.S. 81, 84 (2006).  Section 1997e(a) contains a procedural default component, meaning 
that an inmate is expected to comply with the procedural rules governing grievances.  
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004).  See also Small v. Camden County, 
728 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2013).  However, if a prison official thwarts a prisoner’s 
ability to exhaust his administrative remedies, those remedies are not considered 
available within the meaning of § 1997e(a).  See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112-13 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Although the availability of administrative remedies is a question of law, 
id. at 111, “it necessarily involves a factual inquiry,” Small, 728 F.3d at 271.  Judges may 
resolve factual disputes relating to the exhaustion of administrative remedies without the 
participation of a jury.  Id. 
 After considering the testimony and the record, the Magistrate Judge found that, 
due to numerous inconsistencies and unsupported allegations of a vast conspiracy, Spada 
had not presented a credible case that he asked for but was denied grievance forms during 
the relevant time period.  The Magistrate Judge found that Spada was aware of the need 
to timely pursue his grievance, and credited the testimony of Martinez that, from 
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December 22 through December 27, 2011, Spada had a “level 3” classification, that as a 
“level 3” inmate he was allowed to possess both a “flex pen” and grievance papers in his 
cell, and that grievance forms were near or at the nurse’s station, and thus freely 
available.  Because, as a matter of fact, no employee or agent of SCI-Graterford 
obstructed Spada’s filing of a grievance, the Magistrate Judge concluded as a matter of 
law that administrative remedies were available to Spada at SCI-Graterford and that he 
could have, but failed to, properly pursue his grievance at that institution. 
 Spada did not move for judgment as a matter of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.  If a 
party fails to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all of the evidence, the 
party waives the right to mount any post-trial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.  
See Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1262 (3d Cir. 1991).  Spada also did not 
move for a new trial after the judgment was announced, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).  Insofar 
as the fact-finder “has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, determining the 
weight to be given to the testimony, drawing inferences from the facts established, 
resolving conflicts in evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact,” Garrison v. 
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 959 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), we conclude that the Magistrate Judge properly ordered 
judgment in favor of Martinez and against Spada, in accordance with his findings of fact 
and credibility determinations.  Judgment in favor of Martinez on the ground that Spada 
procedurally defaulted his available administrative remedies was proper because Spada 
did not substantially comply with the prison grievance process, resulting in the rejection 
of his grievance not on the merits but as untimely filed, see Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 
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(“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical 
procedural rules.”).  See also Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231 (same). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the Magistrate 
Judge granting judgment to Martinez on the ground that Spada failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. 
